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I. — INTRODUCTION
In the software industry, the success of the principles that guide the open
source movement can hardly be denied. The combination of a bazaar mode of
organization (Raymond, 1999), of open disclosure of source codes and of a
copyleft type of legal licenses has provided a very successful recipe for pro-
ducing reliable software in a very short spell of time. This initial success of the
open source model in software development raises the issue of the relevance
of exporting it to other sectors (Burk, 2002 ; Maurer, 2003 ; Hope, 2008).
Lakhani and Panetta (2007, p. 98) explain for instance that : « The achieve-
ments of open source software communities have brought the distributed inno-
vation model to general attention so that it is rapidly taking hold in industries
as diverse as apparel and clothing, encyclopaedias, biotechnology and phar-
maceuticals, and music and entertainment ».
The objective of this paper is thus to explore whether the general principles
that guide the production of free-libre-open-source-software (we shall use the
acronym FLOSS in the remainder of this article) can be applied with the same
success in other sectors. The layman’s immediate answer to this question is
that it has already been theorized : the concept of open innovation introduced
by Chesbrough (2003) accounts for the extension of FLOSS to sectors other
than software development. We have already emphasized the fallacy of this
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answer in previous publications and stressed the important differences bet-
ween the open source phenomenon and open innovation (Pénin, 2009).
In this paper, therefore, we propose a general definition of open source inno-
vation (or « OSI ») that is sufficiently broad to encompass not only FLOSS but
also other open source-like production model observed in sectors other than
the software development industry. Our approach is inductive. We start from
the observation of the key principles that govern the functioning of FLOSS and
show that these principles can be applied in other fields. Obviously, many fea-
tures are specific to software production and do not make sense beyond this
field. But overall, we show that the broad principles underlying FLOSS can be
exported to other sectors.
Our definition of OSI is based on the recipe on which the success of FLOSS
rests : the « bazaar » type of organization and the openness of knowledge. We
argue that an innovation process can be considered open source if it has, during
a significant period of time, the three following properties : the actors of the
innovation process (firms or individuals) voluntarily disclose knowledge ;
knowledge is « open », which means that its disclosure is not limited to speci-
fic beneficiaries ; there are continuous interactions between the actors of the
innovation process. Furthermore, we also suggest that it may be necessary to
use intellectual property rights (IPR), and specifically patents, in order to gua-
rantee the openness of the innovation process (Boettiger and Burk, 2004 ;
david, 2006). Indeed, the FLOSS example shows that a specific use of IPR, in
a copyleft fashion, can help preserve the openness of the source code, thus fos-
tering exchanges and collaboration among developers.
Having provided a definition of OSI, we then investigate the specific
contexts in which open source knowledge production processes can be suc-
cessful, i.e. in which case the open source model can replace the proprietary
model based on exclusion. For this purpose, we link OSI to the dynamics of
the innovation process. In particular, we argue that the emergence of OSI set-
tings is all the more probable as the context is « emergent » (Callon, 1999). In
other words, OSI might not replace the proprietary model but rather co-exist
with it : OSI settings may serve as a reservoir, an upstream knowledge platform
that firms can openly use to develop end-products and to compete on downs-
tream markets.
The next section (section 2) defines OSI. The third section outlines the dif-
ferences between OSI and open innovation à la Chesbrough (2003). The four-
th section explains why and in which context the OSI model might be suc-
cessful in sectors other than software. Finally, in the fifth section we provide
two examples that fit this OSI model. We consider the case of BiOS, which
constitutes an attempt to develop a framework of open source biology in the
field of agronomics (Hope, 2008 ; Pénin and Wack, 2008) and the case of crea-
tive industries (Bach et al., 2010).
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II. — A DEFINITION OF OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION
2.1. Definition
Since our definition of OSI is a generalization of the open source model in
the software sector, it makes sense to start with a reminder of the broad prin-
ciples of FLOSS. The extensive literature that has analysed the functioning of
FLOSS in the past decade puts forward three core dimensions : technical, legal
and organisational (Raymond, 1999 ; Lerner and Tirole, 2001 ; Bonaccorsi and
Rossi, 2003 ; dalle and Jullien, 2003 ; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003 ; Lakhani
and Wolf, 2003 ; Henkel, 2006).
— At the technical level, FLOSS are released with their source code. Within
FLOSS projects participants deliberately and freely release their production
(lines of code mostly), which is made available to everybody without discri-
mination. The diffusion of the source code is thus fundamentally open since it
is not restricted to members of the project but is made available to all.
— At the organisational level, FLOSS are developed following a loose orga-
nization called agora or bazaar (Raymond, 1999). This mode of development
differs from the traditional, in-house conception of software, based on hierar-
chy, secrecy and control, and which is compared by Raymond to the building
of Cathedrals. In a bazaar type of organization, hundreds of developers
constantly interact in order to improve the code released by other developers.
Improvements are, in turn, also released so that everybody can validate and,
again, modify them. This collective and communitarian mode of development,
coupled with the open disclosure of source code emphasized above, has pro-
ved very efficient. The open collaboration of developers on a large scale
implies that FLOSS are designed and debugged in a short time (it is the so-cal-
led Linus’ law).
— At the legal level, FLOSS are software protected by original licenses that
prevent the exclusive appropriation of the software and of its subsequent modi-
fications (de Laat, 2005). Indeed, open source projects use a variety of
licenses, more or less based on the copyleft principles introduced by the pio-
neer gPL license, in order to forbid the closing of the source code. Typically,
the license stipulates that everybody can use, modify, copy and even distribu-
te software « protected » by copyleft on the unique condition that any change
is protected by the same system (i.e. the source code of the improvements must
also be copylefted). The license therefore spreads like a virus. Any user who
modifies the software and wishes to distribute his modified version needs to do
so under the copyleft licence in question.
Those three dimensions (technical, organizational and legal) follow a logical
order that can be explained as follows : the objective of most FLOSS projects
is to promote a bazaar mode of software development, which is considered by
many as more efficient. yet, this bazaar-style organization requires that source
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code is openly available. Thus, the technical dimension is necessary to ensure
the sustainability of the organizational dimension. And, in turn, the legal
dimension (copyleft type of protection) serves to ensure the full availability of
the source code. To put it differently, viral licenses, which are used in most
FLOSS projects, are intended to ensure openness and interactivity. The legal
dimension is therefore not constitutive to open source. It is a « support mecha-
nism », an instrument aimed at preserving the openness and interactivity,
which constitute the two pillars of the open source model.
generalizing the main principles of the FLOSS model enables us to propose a
definition of OSI that rests on two properties : openness and interactivity. We
suggest that, in order to qualify as « open source » an innovation process (1)
must have, during a significant period of time, the three following features.
(i)Actors of the innovation process voluntarily disclose the knowledge (tech-
nical or not) they produce (i.e. knowledge in our general setting corresponds
to source code in the specific case of FLOSS).
(ii) This knowledge is « open » in that it must be available not just to some
specified beneficiaries but to everyone without discrimination (i.e. once they
are produced, spillovers are not controllable by the sender, West and gallagher,
2006) (2).
(iii)Actors of the innovation process interact in a bazaar mode, meaning that
the open disclosure of knowledge initiates a long lasting chain of exchanges
and collaborations in order to enrich the open knowledge base (i.e. knowledge
disclosure is continuous and is not the work of one single individual at a single
point in time).
(1) It is important to keep in mind the central distinction between a process and a product.
Both can be open source but our definition of open source clearly deals with the process
of innovation and not with a single product. To quote Weber (2004, p. 14) : « Linux will
not last forever […] Remember what is potentially durable and possibly deserving of the
term “revolutionary” – not a particular manifestation of a process but the process itself »
(p. 14) […]. « The essence of open source is not the software. It is the process by which
software is created. […] If I were writing this book in 1925 and the title was The secret of
Ford I would focus on the factory assembly line and the organization of production around
it, not about the cars Ford produced. Production processes, or ways of making things are
of far more importance than the artifacts produced because they spread more broadly »
(Weber, 2004, p. 56).
(2) As has been shown in the software case, this open dimension is an efficiency condition. It
is only when knowledge is open that one can guarantee its optimal use. Everybody must
have the opportunity to use knowledge in order to improve it, enrich it and put it back into
the open pool. Barriers that would impose some control over the pool or over elements of
it would decrease the efficiency of this process of knowledge enrichment (Lakhani et al.,
2007 ; Murray et al., 2009).
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Our definition implies, first of all, that firms and individuals involved in OSI
really intend to share and to release knowledge, so that knowledge flows can-
not be attributed to undesirable externalities. In other words, spillovers are
endogenous (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998 ; Pénin, 2003).
The second implication was discussed extensively in a previous paper, in
which we proposed a definition of openness for knowledge and technology
(Pénin, 2009). We argued that a piece of knowledge is open if it is made avai-
lable to all either for free (this condition is what we call the strong definition
of openness) or under conditions that are not discriminatory and not prohibiti-
ve (the weak definition). All interested parties must be given access to the
knowledge, which therefore does not belong to just one or several individuals
who would then control other parties’ access to it. In other words, an open
technology is one that has no owner or one whose owner has waived his/her
right to control access. « Open knowledge » must therefore be distinguished
from knowledge that is accessible « free of charge ». A technology may be
« open » but not free of charge, if the fee to access the technology is conside-
red reasonable (Pénin, 2009).
The third requirement for an innovation process to be considered « open
source » is related to the interactions among the participants. It is important to
differentiate between a situation in which actors would just disclose knowled-
ge at one point in time (spot disclosure) and a situation in which firms regu-
larly disclose knowledge, use knowledge disclosed by other firms, disclose
again their improved knowledge, etc. In short, in OSI frameworks, participants
develop dynamic interactions in order to continuously improve and enrich the
open knowledge base. This requirement is in line with that mentioned by
Maurer et al. (2004), who tried to define open source biology and argued that
it should be a « decentralised web-based, community-wide effort, where scien-
tists from laboratories, universities, institutes, and corporations could work
together for a common cause » (Maurer et al., 2004, p. 183). Clearly inherent
in this definition is the necessity for frequent interactions and collaborations
between as many diverse participants as possible.
Our definition of OSI therefore centres around two main dimensions : open-
ness of the produced knowledge and constant interactions between the actors
of the innovation process (3). OSI defines a fundamentally open and interacti-
(3) Our definition of OSI is very similar to what von Hippel (2005, p 93) calls « innovation
communities » and to what Shah (2005) calls « community based innovation » : « In stark
contrast to the proprietary model, the community based model relies neither on exclusive
property rights nor hierarchical managerial control. The model is based upon the open,
voluntary, and collaborative efforts of users » (Shah, 2005, p. 2, Italics are mine). yet, the
word « community », although appropriate to stress the multiple and ongoing interactions
among participants, does not emphasize the open nature of the process. It suggests a fron-
tier between insiders and outsiders of the community. The expression « open innovation
communities » or « open information communities » may therefore be more adapted.
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ve process. Actors in this process develop a dynamic process of collaboration
in order to build an open resource (a technology, software, etc.). Thus, the
three conditions that we have described are equally necessary : an innovation
process that does not operate under these three conditions cannot be conside-
red « open source » (4).
Many examples in the past as well as in recent history fit our definition of
OSI. First of all, « user centred innovation » introduced by von Hippel in the
past two decades often meets the criteria of OSI (5). Open science, as it was
implemented after WWII, is also an attempt to develop and to institutionalize
an OSI model for the production of upstream, fundamental knowledge
(Stephan, 1996). Finally, collective invention as introduced by Allen also
clearly fits in with our definition of OSI (Allen, 1983 ; nuvolari, 2004 ;
Osterloh and Rota, 2007).
To conclude, depending on the contexts, OSI situations can emerge over a
long period (as in the case of software) or on a more « once off » basis, for ins-
tance in the context of a specific project, at the end of which the innovation pro-
cess becomes closed again, because the project stops or because participants
decide to leave the community. However, in any attempt to develop OSI frame-
works one cannot ignore the issue of IPR which, as it has been shown in the case
of software, play a critical role in maintaining the openness of the process.
2.2. IPR’s legal jujitsu
The FLOSS example does indeed suggest that, far from being a threat to
openness, IPR, and patents in particular, may be necessary to sustain OSI
(Pénin and Wack, 2008). Indeed, patents are flexible tools that can serve dif-
ferent purposes, depending on the objectives of their holders : they can exclu-
de imitators but they can also, at the other extreme of the spectrum, prevent
exclusion (Cohendet et al., 2009). Consequently, patents may become impor-
tant instruments for OSI participants in order to make sure that the knowledge
and technologies produced are made available to all and that subsequent
improved versions are also accessible.
(4) This implies that, in practice, many FLOSS projects do not fit with our definition of OSI.
It is indeed well-known that in many cases, FLOSS projects do not interest more than a
couple of isolated developers, and sometimes only one. Therefore, the source code is made
open under copyleft, but the process never starts. In this case, the innovation process is
potentially open source but this potentiality does not become effective.
(5) Within a user centered context of innovation, users voluntarily disclose knowledge, this
disclosure is most of the time open, and it triggers an ongoing chain of feedbacks and
improvements among users and manufacturers. As acknowledged by von Hippel (2005,
p. 10) : « Users who freely release what they have done often find that others then impro-
ve or suggest improvements to the innovation, to mutual benefit ». Examples of such user
centered innovation are the development of high performance windsurf techniques and
equipment in Hawai, the free-libre open source software movement, the development of
mountain bikes, etc.
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More precisely, it may be necessary to rely on copyleft types of licenses in
order to ensure that nobody can appropriate fragments of the open knowledge
base. Indeed the OSI model implies that the users of the open knowledge pool
will voluntarily release their new knowledge into the pool. yet, knowledge being
open and thus accessible to all, outsiders might try to appropriate new pieces of
knowledge designed in the open platform. Those outsiders cannot in theory
patent the knowledge created within the open source project because it is in the
public domain. yet, what they are allowed to do is to improve this knowledge
and to appropriate the improvements, thus introducing boundaries into the open
space. Such behaviors clearly threaten the dynamics and therefore the viability
of OSI. To prevent this from occurring, one can envisage using IPR and patents
particularly, in a « legal jujitsu » logic (Benkler, 2006) (6) as in the case of soft-
ware development (david, 2006 ; Hope, 2008). This original and counter-intui-
tive use of IPR may thus prove necessary to promote the effect of enrichment of
the open knowledge pool, an effect which is at the heart of OSI.
Practically, and as in the case of FLOSS, the open source use of patents is
based on licenses that contain grant-back provisions. depending on the nature
of the product developed by the community, the open knowledge base can be
protected by patents, copyrights or other kinds of IPR. yet, unlike in the case
of the traditional use of IPR, the community can waive its right to control
access to the technology it has produced by granting licenses, either for free or
for a small fee, to all those who wish to. The only requirement to access the
knowledge is then to commit to license any improvement back into the open
pool. To put it differently, users of open source technologies are granted a
license only if they agree to share any alteration they might make to the tech-
nology with its creators and to keep it in the « free » regime so that the know-
ledge and technology remain open and available to all those who agree with
the licensing terms. In the case of patents, this solution is equivalent to crea-
ting an open patent pool (Pénin and Wack, 2008). Compared with these open
source licensing practices, the publication of knowledge into the public
domain does indeed make this knowledge freely accessible but does not ensu-
re that subsequent improvements made to this knowledge will also be freely
accessible. Those strategies entail the risk that follow-on innovators appro-
priate part of the open knowledge base and therein control its use.
To sum up, appropriate licensing contracts, based on the copyleft principle,
might enable patent holders to prevent exclusive appropriation by third parties,
(6) This analogy with jujitsu has been made by Benkler (2006). Jujitsu is a martial art orien-
ted towards active self-defense. Jujitsu practitioners are never offenders but once they are
attacked they practice a pro-active and offensive defense. Having developed several skill-
ful techniques, they are experts in using the strength of their adversaries to their advanta-
ge. Similarly for OSI patent owners use the strength of the patent system against its pri-
mary purpose. In line with the state of mind of martial art practitioners, open source
tenants use IPR to prevent that entire streams of research are closed down by aggressive
appropriation strategies.
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in given technological fields or to impose certain specific uses to licensees
concerning, for instance, the price and the quality of their products, or the requi-
red level of diffusion. Those terms are useful in particular for universities, which
might attach particular importance to the issue of dissemination of knowledge
and research results (Pénin, 2010). Open patent and copyleft-type licenses might
therefore enable universities to prevent the exclusive appropriation of some
technologies they have contributed to develop or, at least, to ensure, to some
extent, that the technology in question is used in the general interest.
The Insulin patent applied for in 1922 by the University of Toronto is a per-
fect example of how a patent can ensure the openness of a technology and of its
improvements (Cassier and Sinding, 2008 ; Pénin, 2010). Against the norms of
the scientific community at the time, the University of Toronto decided to patent
Insulin. It did so not in order to favor the emergence of a monopoly but to pro-
tect the quality of insulin production and ensure its wide accessibility (7). The
University of Toronto decided therefore to grant a non-exclusive license to all
firms who agreed to follow specific good manufacturing practices. Furthermore
firms also had to agree to release any improvements they made (in particular
those related to the manufacturing processes) into the open pool set up and
controlled by the university. This open patent pool was active for almost 30
years, from 1923 until WWII. It guaranteed wide access to the molecule and to
improved insulin products. The Insulin patent is therefore, to some extent, the
ancestor of the copyleft practices that are now common in the software industry.
How well do these viral, copyleft licenses perform their function of suppor-
ting OSI ? This issue was studied by gambardella and Hall (2006), who stress
two opposite effects. On the one hand those licenses may trigger more partici-
pation to the development of the OSI because some contributors, who could
have envisaged contributing under a private patent regime, are now constrai-
ned by the term of the license to contribute in an open way. But on the other
hand, since the license restricts contributors’ rights, it may also deter some of
them from contributing at all, whereas they would have agreed to contribute in
a more closed, proprietary regime. Thus, the desirability of these copyleft-type
licenses is a function of two counter-balancing forces. In particular, the nega-
tive effect emphasized by gambardella and Hall stems from the fact that some
contributors may be frightened by the restrictive terms of the license which, in
the end, may decrease the overall rate of participation and hinder the develop-
ment of the innovation. For instance, in the case of software, it seems that the
more restrictive the open license, the lower the probability of achieving a
stable mature software product (Comino et al., 2007).
(7) According to Cassier and Sinding (2008, p. 156) : « In addition to its role of preventing a
commercial monopoly, the patent gave the university the authority to set the standards of the
new drug, control the quality of its industrial production, and regulate the condition of its
marketing. In the university’s hands the patent was a tool to discipline the industrial world,
to organize the distribution and use of the new drug, and to guarantee its accessibility ».
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III. — OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION VERSUS OPEN INNOVATION
OSI is often mistaken for open innovation, a concept introduced and popu-
larized by Chesbrough (2003) and which has given rise to abundant literature
in organization sciences. yet, the open source mode of knowledge production
entails very different properties (8). In this section, we show that OSI and open
innovation differ with respect to the two central dimensions of OSI : the degree
of openness and the degree of interactivity.
The concept of open innovation requires that firms open up their boundaries
and encourages them, on the one hand, to acquire knowledge and technology
developed elsewhere (through in-licensing, firms’ acquisition and alliances)
and, on the other hand, to export knowledge and technologies developed inside
(through out-licensing, spin-offs and alliances) (9), (10). The practice of open
innovation relies therefore on two types of knowledge flows : outside-in and
inside-out. Firms absorb technology developed by other organizations (outside-
in) and export technology developed inside (inside-out) (Pénin et al., 2011).
Isckia and Lescop (2010) argue that open innovation can be considered as a
new concept only with respect to the inside-out idea. Here, open innovation
goes hand in hand with other trends that have emerged recently : the develop-
ment of markets for technology (Arora et al., 2001) and a more strategic use
of patents by firms (Rivette and Kline, 2000). yet, open innovation can hardly
be considered as a new concept with respect to its outside-in dimension. The
need for firms to absorb relevant knowledge developed elsewhere had already
been well documented in the economic literature long before Chesbrough’s
work (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).
Open innovation is obviously a loose concept. Taken broadly, and not with-
holding the fact that many firms still behave in a very secret and self-reliant
way, everything can be considered as being open innovation. As soon as a firm
(8) For instance, in his book, Democratizing innovation (2005) Eric von Hippel is very care-
ful to draw a clear distinction between open innovation à la Chesbrough, which he calls
distributed innovation, and open source like phenomena.
(9) Chesbrough considers open innovation as the antithesis of the closed innovation model
which he defines as : « the traditional vertical integration model where internal research
and development activities lead to internally developed products that are then distributed
by the firm » (Chesbrough, p. 1, in Chesbrough et al., 2006). More precisely, Chesbrough
adds that : « Open Innovation is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use
external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they
look to advance their technology » (Chesbrough, p. 1, in Chesbrough et al., 2006).
(10) Open innovation has many points in common with other concepts developed recently by
other scholars, be it « disintegrated innovation », « modular innovation » (Brusoni and
Prencipe, 2003), « distributed innovation » (Kogut and Meciu, 2008 ; McKelvey, 1998),
« dispersed innovation » (Becker, 2001) or « collaborative innovation ». All these concepts
emphasise the fact that useful knowledge being increasingly dispersed, innovative activi-
ties are not the fact of one single entity but are distributed over a wide spectrum of hete-
rogeneous actors.
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does not do everything by itself (when it acquires a start-up, licenses in or out
a patent, creates a spin-off, crowd-sources some of its research activities, etc.)
it behaves in accordance with open innovation principles. It is therefore essen-
tial, for the sake of clarification, to situate the concept of OSI in relation to
open innovation. We argue here that it is possible to rank closed innovation,
open innovation and OSI on a spectrum, according to their degrees of open-
ness and interactivity.
Closed innovation is located at the extreme left of the spectrum. It defines a
framework in which knowledge is not open and firms interact little with one
another. Firms are strongly self-reliant. They rely on appropriation strategies
such as secrecy and exclusive IPR. Knowledge and technologies are not sha-
red with nor made available to other firms. Furthermore, firms do not collabo-
rate with other organizations, even selectively, for any given period of time. To
use a simple metaphor, within a closed innovation environment, firms’ resear-
ch labs have no doors through which knowledge could flow in or out.
Open innovation is situated in the middle of the spectrum. It refers to a situa-
tion that is moderately open and modestly interactive. It is not very interactive
because firms, although they allow knowledge to flow in or out, do not deve-
lop a pattern of continuous and regular exchanges. Interactions occur only at
one moment in time and then stop. Open innovation is about firms that grant
licenses to other firms or who create spin-offs. This concept is hence about
bilateral (market) exchanges rather than community based interactions.
Furthermore, open innovation is only moderately open because in most
cases, firms keep considerable control over their knowledge and technology
(even though control is less tight than in the closed innovation case). Contrary
to closed innovation, open innovation acknowledges the possibility of know-
ledge flows, but these flows are tightly controlled by firms, who continue to
rely on secrecy and aggressive patenting strategies to prevent other firms from
accessing their knowledge. Open innovation therefore implies permeable orga-
nizational boundaries (11). To use the same metaphor as above, it means that
there is a door but this door can be open or closed according to the willingness
of the firm, who still controls entries and exits.
Open source innovation, as mentioned above, lies at the extreme right of the
spectrum. It is at once more open and more interactive than open innovation.
It is more interactive in that firms continuously exchange knowledge over a
significantly long period of time. Thus, whereas open innovation is about spot
knowledge transaction, on a market of technologies for instance, OSI is clear-
(11) Indeed, Chesbrough proposed a very specific definition of openness. He used the words
open and closed because in one case (the closed innovation paradigm) « projects can only
enter in one way, at the beginning, and can only exit in one way, by going into the mar-
ket » and in the other case (the open innovation paradigm) « there are many ways for ideas
to flow into the process, and many ways for it to flow into the market » (Chesbrough, p. 2
and 3 ; in Chesbrough et al., 2006).
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ly about collective and community-based knowledge production. OSI involves
community and peer production while, most of the time, open innovation relies
on bilateral exchanges (in and out-licensing, merges, spin-in and out, etc.).
Furthermore, OSI is more open because firms abandon their right to control
the use of the technologies they develop. They give up any possibility of
controlling knowledge flows in the sense that anybody can use the knowledge
once it has been disclosed. Contrary to an open innovation situation, partici-
pants in OSI projects do not rely on exclusive appropriation strategies.
Therefore, while Chesbrough envisages openness as a situation in which a firm
has permeable boundaries (information and technologies can come in and out
but remain controlled to some extent), in OSI contexts knowledge and techno-
logy are not controlled by an owner who could arbitrarily restrict their access.
For instance, one of the main, if not the main feature of FLOSS, is that any-
body can access the source code. With respect to this characteristic, FLOSS are
not only a distributed process, but they are also fundamentally open ; at least,
far more open than what is usually meant by open innovation (Lakhani and
Panetta, 2007) (12). To use the metaphor of the door again, in the case of OSI
there is a door and this door is open for everybody (there may be some condi-
tions for entering but they are reasonable and are the same for all).
To summarize, with respect to the degree of openness, it is possible to illus-
trate the differences between closed innovation, open innovation and OSI by
considering the case of a patented technology : once a firm develops a techno-
logy and patents it, it can adopt the following strategies : (1) closed innovation :
exclusivity and secrecy are preserved. The technology is not licensed at all. (2)
Open innovation : the technology is eventually licensed or cross-licensed but
only to some firms that have been previously selected. (3) OSI : the firm waives
its right of control over the patent. Everybody can use the patented technolo-
gy (sometimes in return for a reasonable fee) (Example : the Cohen-Boyer
patent applied for by Stanford University, see Pénin, 2010).
IV. — OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION AND THE DYNAMICS
OF INNOVATION
Isolated examples suggest that OSI can be quite successful in some cases.
However, proprietary and exclusive strategies are essential features of our
(12) Lakhani and Panetta (2007) acknowledge this difference between open innovation and the
open source software movement : « OSS communities represent the most radical edge of
openness and sharing observed to date in complex technology development. OSS commu-
nities are open in the sense that their outputs can be used by anyone (within the limits of
the license), and anyone can join by subscribing to the development e-mail list » (Lakhani
and Panetta, 2007, p. 107, italics are mine). West and gallagher (2006, p. 94, italics are
mine) also conclude that : « an open source model is inherently more ‘open’ than a typi-
cal R&D consortium, both in terms of exploiting information from outside the consortium,
and sharing this information back out to nonmember organizations and individuals ».
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modern economies. Obviously, goods and services cannot all be produced
under the open source model. nevertheless, we believe, as nelson (2004) does,
that any innovation is somehow built upon « something » that is open and thus
it is important that this « something » remains open (13). Open and closed
dimensions might therefore be two complementary and equally important
facets of innovation. In particular, the concept of OSI can be especially pro-
mising when it is envisaged as contributing to the development of an open
knowledge platform firms can tap into in order to develop downstream appli-
cations. This point is easily understood when one considers the dynamic fra-
mework of innovation built by Callon (1993 ; 1999).
4.1. The Callon model (14)
Callon distinguishes two phases of the innovation process : an emerging phase
and a stabilised phase. Whereas in a stabilised situation knowledge is easily
reproducible and the primary intention of inventors is therefore to protect their
inventions from imitation, in emerging phases it is the opposite. Knowledge is
sticky, market perspectives are uncertain, players in the field are unknown (15).
In this emergent framework, innovating firms’ main objective is not to exclude
other firms, but rather to include them (i.e. finding collaborators, suppliers, cus-
tomers, financers, etc.). This need for collaboration is all the more relevant as
the technology is complex and modular and network effects are strong.
This argument developed by Callon refers to an essential aspect that was
underestimated by Arrow (1962) : the exploration of the conditions of deve-
lopment of new technologies. In order to underline the dilemma between
incentives and diffusion, Arrow simplified innovation into a two-phase pro-
cess : invention and then diffusion of the invention. All the aspects related to
the complex dynamics linked to the genesis of the innovation were neglected
thus reducing innovation to a static two-step game.
during the first step of the creation of technological trajectories, the tradi-
tional Arrovian framework underestimates the need for common knowledge
between actors. For Arrow, the knowledge producer is a single individual.
nothing is said about any need for external knowledge in order to invent, nor
about any community of actors that would help throughout the process of crea-
(13) Openness, sharing and freedom of use have always proved important elements of the inno-
vation process (McLeod and nuvolari (2006 ; 2008). Mc Leod and nuvolari (2008), p. 15)
stress for instance that : « As a final consideration, it is important not to dismiss these cases
of collective invention as ‘‘curious exceptions’’. It is worth stressing, once more, that key
technologies that lay at the heart of the industrialization process, such as high pressure
steam engines, steamboats, iron production techniques, etc., were at times developed in a
collective invention fashion, and consequently outside the coverage of the patent system ».
(14) This section is drawn from Cohendet, Farcot and Pénin (2009).
(15) This emerging phase corresponds, in a way, to what Anderson and Tushman (1990) call
the « era of ferment ».
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tion (the so called knowing communities). The solitary hero is therefore the
only one who should be able to claim any ownership on his invention. yet, still
according to Arrow, the public good nature of knowledge decreases his incen-
tives to innovate. The dissemination of knowledge is here considered isotro-
pic : the diffusion of an innovation is not intended to follow a particular path.
The possibility that inventors are able to choose the individuals, groups or
communities with whom they will develop a common knowledge base is not
recognized. On the contrary, the inventor is supposed to face anonymous actors
who are looking for any opportunity to steal his creation. And this free riding
behaviour can easily occur since every potential imitator is supposed to be able
to reproduce the knowledge immediately at zero cost.
For Callon, this scenario can occur, but only in extreme circumstances, cor-
responding to stable situations in which languages and competences are alrea-
dy shared among the actors of innovation. The traditional framework (non
rivalry and non excludability of knowledge) only prevails when the technolo-
gical trajectories and languages have been developed and shared among indi-
viduals and organisations.
Callon (1999) shows that during the first phase of the creation of an innova-
tion, when common languages and thought patterns do not yet exist, the exact
opposite happens. Innovation generally occurs in an environment of strong
uncertainty about the actors, their objectives, their capacities, etc. Knowledge
in this context is marked by strong rivalry (it is hard to reproduce it outside the
local context where the discovery has been made) and strong exclusivity (the
invention is linked to the tacit knowledge of the inventor). The inventor is less
likely to be faced with a free-riding or imitation-related problem than with an
issue related to other actors’ misunderstanding which could lead to his margi-
nalisation (Callon, 1993). differences in language, in cognitive models or sim-
ply the existence of a tacit dimension imply that knowledge exchanges are dif-
ficult. And the more heterogeneous the actors involved in the innovation pro-
cess, the more relevant those problems of communication and exchanges.
In other words, in emerging phases, the inventor does not face a leaky know-
ledge problem (which would decrease its incentive to invent) but rather a stic-
ky knowledge problem, which undermines his ability to interact with the other
actors of the innovation process (16). Thus, it is necessary for the innovation
actors, during the first stages of the construction of a technological trajectory,
to exchange knowledge and information, to cooperate in order to develop com-
mon cognitive frames and above all to fix common objectives. Technological
trajectories cannot develop unless a public or semi-public common knowled-
ge basis was defined beforehand in order to allow for the reproduction, expan-
sion, and development of the first creative ideas.
(16) This issue is also raised by gibbons (1994) in his distinction between mode 1 and mode
2 of knowledge production : « In mode 2, knowledge production and knowledge appro-
priation converge. The outcomes are likely to be commensurate with the degree of invol-
vement. Only those who take part in knowledge production are likely to share its appro-
priation » (gibbons, 1994, p. 165).
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To sum up, the first stages of innovation are complex and mostly collective pro-
cesses during which actors need to exchange and cooperate. This view of innova-
tion stands in sharp contrast to the traditional framework and its theory of know-
ledge spillovers, which considers that once knowledge is created, it is available
for anyone to use. It is indeed the complex dynamics of evolution of technologi-
cal trajectories that is underestimated in the traditional framework. The main
weakness of the Arrow model is that it reduces the complexity of technological
trajectories to a two-phase process. At one extreme, there is one single individual
that has a creative idea. At the other lies a universe where all individuals have the
same knowledge and are able to exploit the innovation. This reduction has an
advantage : it draws the attention on incentive-related considerations. But it also
has one major flaw: it underestimates the needs for coordination between the
innovation actors, especially during the early stages of creation of an innovation.
4.2. Platform, co-opetition and incentives
Callon’s view of the dynamics of innovation has important implications for
open source and the strategic use of IPR. Among others, he suggests that OSI
might be especially promising in upstream, emerging situations, when coordi-
nation problems exceed those related to incentives. In those contexts actors of
the innovation process need less to exclude than to include and collaborate,
which might explain the attractiveness of OSI in order to build common lan-
guages and knowledge bases. It is indeed in upstream situations and when tra-
jectories are not well defined, that openness is the most valuable. As pointed
out by Baldwin and Woodard (2009), the main value of openness is an option
value. An open regime favours exploration and experimentation (Murray et al.,
2009, develop a similar argument). Thus, it is clearly more efficient when the
situation (both with respect to demand and/or technology) is uncertain and
unpredictable. To quote Baldwin and Woodard (2009, p. 38) : « In these cases,
it is not obvious what will succeed, hence the value of multiple experimenta-
tion and diverse approach is high ». This obviously suggests, and the examples
we provide in this paper are in line with this view, that OSI may be especially
promising for promoting the development of emerging technologies, that are
relatively far from the end product market (17).
The open source production process can prove highly efficient for developing
an industrial open platform (gawer and Cusumano, 2002 ; gawer, 2009) (18),
which businesses can freely use in order to develop finished products. This view
(17) note that this view of OSI is in keeping with studies that underlined the costs of strong
appropriation regimes in the case of cumulative innovations (Scotchmer, 1991 ; 2004 ;
Murray and O’Mahony, 2007 ; Pénin and Wack, 2008 ; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).
(18) gawer and Cusumano (2002) argue that an industry platform provides a common foun-
dation or core technologies that firms can reuse. They also stress the fact that industry plat-
forms have relatively little value to users unless they are combined with in-house comple-
mentary assets. More recently, gawer (2009) defined a platform as « a building block
which acts as a foundation upon which other firms can develop complementary products,
technologies or services » (2009, p. 2).
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of OSI fits with a model of open co-opetition (Brandenburger and nalebuff,
1996), i.e. which would not be limited to a few organizations but may potentially
concern all the actors of a given field and beyond. Within OSI frameworks, firms
and communities of individuals collaborate to feed an open pool of knowledge,
which can then serve as a basis for corporate competition. In other words, actors
of the innovation process collaborate upstream, in order to develop a solid reser-
voir of open knowledge, but may continue to compete on downstream markets.
Consequently, OSI may not replace corporate innovation but rather co-evolve
with it. A parallel can be drawn with the linear model of innovation which consi-
ders open science as providing the industry with a reservoir of public, basic
knowledge that firms use in order to do applied research (The « republic of scien-
ce » vs. the « kingdom of industry », nelson 1959 ; Polanyi, 1962). In this model,
public and open research on the one hand, and corporate and closed research on
the other hand, are also viewed as perfect complements. The sphere of open
science is considered as a platform for industrial competition. That this model is
not considered relevant anymore does not prove that openness is not important ;
it only means that actors of the innovation process may have to establish new
strategies to build and secure the open knowledge base into which they can tap.
Thus, the preservation of openness does not only rely on public research (which
increasingly tends to adopt closed strategies based on secrecy and patenting) but
constitutes a challenge for all the actors of the innovation process. Many corpo-
rate actors have already understood this need to rely, to some extent, on OSI fra-
meworks and have changed some of their behaviours accordingly.
This is particularly true in creative industries (see section 5.2 below).
Similarly, the example of BiOS – detailed below – is perfectly in line with this
view of OSI as providing a platform of knowledge and technology that firms can
use in order to compete on downstream markets. The emergence of the airplane
industry just before WWI, as described by Meyer (2010), also fits perfectly with
this co-opetition model. Based on a detailed bibliometric analysis of the period
1860 to WWI, Meyer distinguishes two phases in the emergence of this indus-
try : a pre-market phase, in which individuals did not hesitate to collaborate and
share their discovery in a way that is quite similar to what happens in the case
of OSI. This phase lasted until 1907. Then, when opportunities of profit became
apparent and the market phase was initiated, the behaviors of the innovation
actors completely reversed : they protected their discoveries by strong patents
and endeavoured to divulge as little information as possible to competitors.
If OSI can contribute to develop a platform on which competitive firms may
rely, it is important to investigate why firms and individuals would participate
in the construction of this open platform. This is indeed an important issue in
economics : why would rational economic actors be willing to contribute to the
construction of a public good? Economic literature suggests that such collec-
tive provision of a pure public good is undermined by free riding. And the lar-
ger the number of participants, the higher the incentives to free-ride. Here
again, lessons from the software sector can help to understand why firms and
individuals can actively contribute to build an open knowledge platform.
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First, at individual level, many studies have underlined the complex mix of
motivations that cause individuals to devote time and resources to developing
FLOSS (Lerner and Tirole, 2001 ; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003 ; dalle and
Jullien, 2003 ; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003 ; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003). These
studies, among others, emphasize that, although extrinsic motivations are
important, intrinsic types of motivation dominate. And there is no reason to
consider that this result is specific to software. Intrinsic types of motivation
can boost individual participation in many different fields in which firms can
therefore envisage to rely on a community of individuals, who can be users
(von Hippel, 2005) or not. This is true in the video-game business, for instan-
ce (Cohendet and Simon, 2007), and more generally in all creative industries
(Lessig, 2001). It is also true in biology, and more generally in all science-
based industries, in which scientists may, for various reasons (gold, reputation,
puzzle-solving), be willing to contribute to a pool of upstream knowledge (in
the pharmaceutical sector for instance).
Furthermore, at the firm level, another result of empirical studies on partici-
pants’ motivation in FLOSS projects is that, in many cases, individuals contri-
bute to the projects in question during their working hours with the consent of
their employers (Lakhani and Wolf, 2003). This clearly suggests that firms
may also find it profitable to participate (O’Mahony, 2003). For instance, it
seems that in many cases free-riding is made difficult by the fact that in order
to tap into the open reservoir one needs to actively contribute to it. In particu-
lar, the absorption of the tacit dimension of knowledge requires that the firm
develop close links with the community, which in turn forces it to participate.
von Hippel and von Krogh (2006) therefore propose a model of « private-col-
lective » incentives to participate, in which free-riding is limited by the speci-
ficities of the good. Firms can also base their business model on activities that
are complementary to the open platform. They may rely on complementary
assets that are protected (Teece, 1986). Thus, these firms can be encouraged to
contribute to the development of the platform so as to add value to these com-
plementary activities. Finally, it is also important to note that « copyleft »
licenses can force some firms to release their knowledge back into the com-
mon pool, thus also contributing to the enrichment of the open platform.
To summarize this discussion, according to Osterloh and Rota (2007), firms
and individuals are more willing to contribute to OSI projects if : (i) the lear-
ning potential is important, i.e. the sharing of information and knowledge leads
to more than the sum of all knowledge ; (ii) opportunity costs are low and (iii)
the benefits are proportional to the degree of participation. Clearly, these three
conditions are mostly valid in contexts that are emerging and situated far from
the market. In those situations participants in OSI can build an open knowled-
ge platform that firms can use to develop end-market products. In the next sec-
tion we provide two examples that illustrate this dynamic view of OSI : we
consider the case of BiOS, which is an attempt to develop open source biolo-
gy for upstream research tools (Hope, 2008 ; Pénin and Wack, 2008) and the
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case of creative industries which rely on underground, creative communities in
order to continuously introduce novelty.
V. — TWO EXAMPLES OF OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION
5.1. Open source biology : the case of BiOS (19)
BiOS constitutes an attempt at setting up a framework of open source biolo-
gy in the field of agronomics (Hope, 2008 ; Pénin and Wack, 2008). BiOS
stands for Biological Open Source. It is a sub-part of a wider project entitled
BIOS, for Biological Innovation for an Open Society. This initiative was laun-
ched by Cambia (for Centre for the application of molecular biology to inter-
national agriculture), a non-profit organization (Hope, 2008).
In the domain of agricultural biotechnology, the BiOS consortium aims at
developing open – easily reusable research tools. A research tool is used only for
research purposes. It is not considered as an application that can be commercia-
lized on the end-market, but it serves as a springboard for those downstream
innovations (Walsh et al., 2003). Research tools are therefore part of a sequen-
tial process of innovation, being situated upstream of the development of appli-
cations such as new drugs or new crops. These follow-on innovations rely on the
invention, diffusion and usage of research tools. Research tools are therefore a
typical example of a « platform technologies » (Pray and naseem, 2005).
The upstream position of research tools in the innovation process in modern
biotechnology makes their mode of appropriation a core issue. Since they are
input into the development of further applications it is highly important that
they remain easily available for reuse. Furthermore, since research tools are
used for operations situated far from the end market, firms may be more
willing to collaborate for their open development. Thus, research tools might
be good candidates for the implementation of an open source development
process. And this is exactly what BiOS endeavors to do : to develop a set of
research tools in an open source environment.
Concretely, BiOS has formed a patent pool with its own patents and agrees
to grant non-exclusive licenses only to those who accept the viral terms of the
BiOS license. Thus, in order to use the technologies patented by BiOS, a third
party has to agree to grant-back any improvements and modifications into the
open patent pool. In a dynamic perspective, this creates an environment : « in
which a material or invention can be improved by the ideas of many, but access
is maintained for all who agree to the terms, without exclusive capture by
anyone » (BiOS homepage) (20). This viral clause of licensing implies that
research tools that build on a technology patented by BiOS cannot be appro-
(19) This section is drawn from Pénin and Wack (2008).
(20) http://www.bios.net (accessed [05/07/2010]).
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priated. They remain available for reuse. This creates a favourable environment
for collaborations, exchanges and cumulative inventions. Furthermore,
although the use of a BiOS patent is open, it may not necessarily be free of
charge. Private members of OECd countries are, in addition to agree to the
licensing terms, required to pay a participation fee.
yet, BiOS acknowledges that producers of downstream applications need to
make money out of their investments. Thus, openness only concerns the resear-
ch tools situated upstream of the innovation process, and not their downstream
development. developers of potential applications of the BiOS research tools
are free to individually control new strains of plants, through patents if they so
wish. This limit to openness is related to the nature of innovation in the field of
biotechnology. As Maurer et al. (2004) have highlighted, there has to be some
degree of appropriation in the innovation process so that firms have enough
incentives to invest in and develop commercial applications. The development
of biotech applications is costly, which means that an organization that rests
solely on the decentralized contributions of a community of private, garage-
based scientists with intrinsic, and limited extrinsic, motivations, is unlikely to
reach the commercial success of FLOSS projects. Thus, BiOS aims at preser-
ving the openness of the research tools without diminishing firms’ incentives to
develop commercial applications based on these research tools.
As yet it is unclear whether the BiOS initiative will succeed or fail.
discussions with actors in the field suggest that many firms are reluctant to
participate due to the restrictive conditions of the license (especially the requi-
rement to grant-back improvements), which is in keeping with the prediction
of gambardella and Hall’s model (2006). nevertheless the BiOS initiative
illustrates the platform nature of OSI and puts forward the potential of OSI as
complementary to corporate activities, thus offering firms infrastructures and
technologies at a minimum cost.
5.2. The IPR dilemma in creative industries (21)
The emergence of the creative industries as one of the main drivers of growth
in the knowledge-based economy has important implications for IPR and the
concept of OSI. Innovation in creative industries is generally a collective effort
that necessitates the interaction and coordination of a great diversity of econo-
mic actors. For instance, the production of a video-game requires the participa-
tion of hundreds, sometimes thousands of different contributors : artists, musi-
cians, game designers, etc. Thus, when considering the question of attribution of
IPR one cannot ignore the « dispersed » nature of the creation process in creati-
ve industries. Basically, stakeholders of the creative process can be divided into
three broad categories : talented individuals, firms and creative communities.
Specific attention must be paid to creative communities. In creative industries
firms are not backed by a regulated and institutionalized universe which could be
compared to the open science, nor is it the result of a single individual process.
(21) This section is drawn from Bach, Cohendet, Pénin and Simon (2010).
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Creative ideas emerge and develop in an informal universe that is sometimes cal-
led underground (Cohendet and Simon, 2007). Thus, the locus of creation is roo-
ted in the various informal communities with which firms and individuals must
somehow maintain links in order to ensure sustained innovation. By creative
communities, we refer here to informal groups of individuals who are willing to
exchange on a regular basis in order to create knowledge in a given field.
The role played by these communities in the creative process is essential : as
the knowledge-based economy expands, such communities bear significant
parts of the sunk costs associated with the process of generation or accumula-
tion of specialized sets of knowledge. They progressively develop a common
knowledge base, a model and a « grammar » (a « codebook », according to
Cowan et al., 2000), that will enable the creator to develop its idea sufficient-
ly to make it economically viable. As a result, these communities are places for
the accumulation of innovative micro-ideas, which may be potential sources of
future creativity. In other words, creative communities are the main consti-
tuents of the « underground » from which creative industries draw their inno-
vative power. They channel promising ideas and concepts developed under-
ground and progressively bring them to the market.
The emergence of creative industries raises new research questions. For ins-
tance, Cohendet and Simon (2007) study the compatibility between traditional
rules of corporate governance and creative communities. They show that it
may be difficult for firms to manage, drive and harness creative communities
without sterilising them. Another research question deals with the use of IPR :
how can the three categories of actors of the creative process reconcile their
different wishes and needs in terms of IPR ? Basically, individuals desire
strong individual IPR, firms aim at strong corporate IPR, whereas creative
communities require weak IPR, or even no IPR at all, so as to be able to easi-
ly use and combine existing art, which is the raw material of creation. Creative
projects can only flourish under weak IPR because they entail integrating, cut-
ting and pasting, assembling creative elements dispersed among a vast array of
technical and cultural activities carried out by diverse and distinct actors. Thus,
in order to foster novelty, firms, individuals and communities must rely on
some kind of open spaces (Lessig, 2001 ; 2004). A minimum of openness
(which might not mean an absence of property) is necessary to enable creati-
ve communities to work properly.
These different logics that drive individuals, firms and communities are what
we call the « IPR dilemma » in creative industries. For firms, this dilemma can
be described as follows : on the one hand they need strong IPR to exclude imi-
tators, prevent copying and therefore secure some market power. The main ins-
truments to do so are copyrights, trademarks, patents, trade secrets, or some
combination of the above. yet, on the other hand firms also need to bring out the
creative potential of the creators. And with respect to this need, a systematic use
of exclusive contracts of the « work for hire » type may lead to the erosion of
creativity. In this respect, it is therefore important for firms to moderate their use
of exclusive IPR in order to preserve privileged links with creative communities.
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To summarize, creative industries are a good illustration of how OSI (called
here knowledge communities) provides a platform of new ideas that firms can
use ; but they also pinpoint the tensions that may arise in this particular rela-
tionship between corporate actors and underground communities. In particu-
lar, they suggest that a critical issue with respect to innovation in creative
industries has to do with the strategies that are implemented to handle the IPR
dilemma. Firms involved in the creative process might have to make specific
arrangements in order to optimize their relationships with creative communi-
ties. For instance, firms might be forced to give up using over-aggressive stra-
tegies and to accept, to some extent, new uses of IPR, in particular those based
on copyleft strategies, creative commons, etc. The two examples of the music
industry and of the video-game industry studied by Bach et al. (2010) illustra-
te that IPR in creative industries can only be the outcome of a delicate balan-
ce between exclusion and openness. developing an ongoing creative dynamic
process requires the preservation of this fragile equilibrium which ensures the
co-evolution of individuals, firms and a creative underground.
VI. — CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a general definition of OSI, valid not only in soft-
ware but also in other sectors, and investigated in what situations such OSI
projects can emerge. Our definition rests on two pillars : openness and interac-
tivity. OSI is both an open and deeply interactive process. Actors in OSI pro-
jects openly divulge the knowledge they produce and develop ongoing
exchanges with each others’, therefore favouring a bazaar mode of knowledge
production (Raymond, 1999). Furthermore, we have argued that such OSI fra-
meworks are more likely to develop in emerging phases, when needs for col-
laboration exceed the needs for exclusion.
This work, by proposing a clear definition of OSI, contributes to emphasi-
zing the difference between open source-like mode of knowledge production
and open innovation as defined by Chesbrough (2003). Those two concepts,
although often confused as being the same, are quite different. They differ with
respect to both their degrees of openness and of interactivity. In particular,
most cases studied by Chesbrough do not coincide with our definition of open-
ness because firms do not make relevant information available to all but only
to a small number of partners.
OSI is a recent concept. A lot of work remains to be done both theoretically
and empirically. Here are some burning questions which we believe are parti-
cularly important.
First of all, we need to improve our understanding of the dynamics of OSI.
The Callon model captures the essential argument (innovation is a dynamic
process that involves different phases, either emerging or stabilized) but still
leaves many important questions unanswered. It tells nothing, for example, of
the transition from an emerging to a stabilized situation. Similarly, it does not
examine the transition from an innovation cycle to another, when emerging
situations replace old and stable technologies. during those transition phases
the process becomes either more closed or more open and thus the role and
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shape of OSI communities should evolve. For instance, at the end of emerging
phases, the open source model should make way for exclusion strategies and
the OSI actors should possibly turn to other projects. But, how is this transi-
tion coordinated? What are the frictions that may emerge in this phase of chan-
ge? Who steers the process ?
Another central issue has to do with the viability of OSI in competitive
contexts. The point we have made in this article is that OSI is a complement
rather than a substitute for proprietary innovation. Consequently, OSI is a pro-
mising concept mostly in upstream, pre-competitive situations, since in these
contexts coordination needs overcome competition effects. yet, a more inter-
esting step would be to explore whether or not OSI can succeed in competiti-
ve phases and under which conditions. To my knowledge there is as yet no
example of an OSI initiative in such a competitive context (except software).
In relation to the above point, it will also be important, from a managerial
perspective, to improve our understanding of the business models that enable
firms to exploit and use the strength of OSI. Is it possible to develop business
models that are fully compatible with OSI ? More modestly, is it possible for
firms to develop hybrid strategies between exclusive and open access in order
to reconcile their need of appropriation and of creation? If so, under which
conditions ? For instance, crowdsourcing is often presented as a hybrid strate-
gy (a mix of strong appropriability and peer production) (Howe, 2006). yet, we
know that crowdsourcing in the case of inventive and complex activities raises
many problems and is likely to work only in limited contexts (Pénin and
Burger-Helmchen, 2011).
Another issue that has been neglected here but that cannot be ignored in futu-
re research deals with the practical implementation of OSI. In the real world,
OSI attempts are likely to be strongly idiosyncratic and hardly implementable
elsewhere without important changes. This is because in order to work, OSI
must be tailored to the context and must rely on stable local communities. For
instance, the design of appropriate IPR is critical and will have to be adapted
to each context. Unlimited viral licenses can hardly be accepted in all sectors
so that licenses will have to be tailored in such ways as to make them accep-
table to all parties (de Laat, 2005).
Furthermore, the development of OSI in various sectors strongly depends on
the creation and development of local communities that are in charge of ela-
borating and diffusing the norms which help to regulate the behaviour of all
the different actors and which are therefore necessary for the development of
open source innovation. Indeed, one of the first and major tasks in order to pro-
mote the emergence of OSI in a given field might be to design formal and
informal rules likely to be accepted by most players and to fit the specificity
of each technology. This implies that implementing OSI will require a long
period of preparation and will be strongly path dependant. For instance, the
success of FLOSS nowadays can to a large extent be attributed to the long las-
ting work of the free software foundation. Thus, since norms and rules are
mainly situated within communities, the diffusion of OSI is likely to take place
within communities. How rules spread from one community to another is a
fundamental research question that needs further investigation.
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